Distinguishing between use and abuse of EU free movement law : evaluating use of the 'Europe-route' for family reunification to overcome reverse discrimination by Kroeze, Hester
 European Papers www.europeanpapers.eu ISSN 2499-8249 
Vol. 3, 2018, No 3, pp. 1209-1243  doi: 10.15166/2499-8249/267 
 
Articles 




Distinguishing Between Use and Abuse 
of EU Free Movement Law: 
Evaluating Use of the “Europe-route” 
for Family Reunification 






TABLE OF CONTENTS: I. Introduction. – II. Reverse discrimination: colliding constitutional principles in EU law. 
– III. Abuse of EU law: definition and background. – IV. Abuse in the context of family reunification rights. – 
V. The case-law of the Court of Justice on family reunification law abuse. – VI. The Commission Communi-
cation with guidelines for the implementation of Directive 2004/38. – VII. The follow-up. – VIII. Abuse v. 
non-applicability of EU law. – IX. Concluding remarks. 
 
ABSTRACT: Equality is a fundamental principle of EU law but protection of the Member States’ compe-
tence to regulate their own nationals’ legal position, anchored in the division of competences, may 
cause inequality among citizens. Reverse discrimination occurs when EU citizens who reside in their 
own Member State and are in a purely internal situation are subject to the law of this Member State, 
while EU citizens who fall within the scope of EU law through the use of free movement rights benefit 
from more lenient EU rules. Both equality among EU Member States and the division of competences 
are important principles of EU constitutionalism. Proposed remedies should, therefore, fit within the 
constitutional system of the EU. In its case-law, the Court makes EU citizenship rights more accessible 
and empowers EU citizens to change the legal regime that applies to them by moving across a bor-
der. This case-law opens up a possibility to circumvent national immigration law. This Article inquires 
whether the use of EU law for this purpose should be considered to be abuse of law. In addition, it 
discusses the role of the European Convention on Human Rights in the protection of families, when 
EU law does not apply. The first part of the Article discusses the constitutional background in which 
reverse discrimination and family reunification are situated. The second part studies the concept of 
abuse of law in the context of EU citizenship and the question when family reunification on the basis 
of EU law can be classified as such, as well as the implications thereof. 
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I. Introduction 
The Maastricht Treaty in 1992 marked “a new stage in the process of creating an ever 
closer union among the peoples of Europe”.1 Before 1992, European integration was 
built upon economic premises, which translated into the four fundamental freedoms of 
goods, persons, services and capital.2 Rights that were given to individuals were aimed 
at realizing the economic goals that were part of the EEC’s design.3 The right to family 
reunification for workers, for instance, was granted to facilitate their integration into the 
host Member State and to further the economic purpose of their movement.4 There-
fore, it was only available to those who move to or reside in a Member State of which 
they are not a national.5 The Maastricht Treaty was proclaimed to broaden the sphere 
of European cooperation by establishing the EU, and introduced EU citizenship.6 
The introduction of EU citizenship by the Maastricht Treaty is taken as a starting 
point for this Article, which departs from the premise that one of the qualities that citi-
zenship confers is equality before the law.7 It is shown, however, that equality before 
 
1 Art. A of the 1992 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty). It is debated whether the Maas-
tricht promise has realized its full potential. See e.g. D. KOCHENOV, R. PLENDER, EU Citizenship: From an In-
cipient Form to an Incipient Substance?, in European Law Review, 2012, p. 369. 
2 Now Arts 30, 34, 45, 49, 56 and 63 TFEU. C. BARNARD, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four 
Freedoms, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Despite its economic premises, the European Economic 
Community (EEC) was a political project that was meant to further peace and welfare after the Second World 
War. An economic approach was chosen, however, because political integration was not feasible, and the 
original plan to establish a European Political Community and/or a European Defence Community was re-
jected by the French Parliament. R. KOOPMANS, P. STATHAM (eds), The Making of a European Public Sphere: 
Media Discourse and Political Contention, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 16 et seq. 
3 First the EEC, later the Economic Community (EC), and now the European Union. A. TRYFONIDOU, Re-
verse Discrimination in EC Law, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2009, p. 5 et seq.; J. 
CROON-GESTEFELD, Reconceptualising European Equality Law: A Comparative Institutional Analysis, London: 
Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017, p. 4.  
4 C. BERNERI, Family Reunification in the EU: The Movement and Residence Rights of Third Country 
National Family Members of EU Citizens, London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017, p. 8; P. BOELES, M. DEN 
HEIJER, G. LODDER, K. WOUTERS, European Migration Law, Cambridge: Intersentia, 2014, p. 30. 
5 Now: Art. 3 of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 
on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States. 
6 Among other institutional changes, such as the introduction of new policy areas by the Maastricht 
Treaty. 
7 D. KOCHENOV, Citizenship Without Respect: The EU’s Troubled Equality Ideal, in Jean Monnet Work-
ing Paper, no. 8, 2010, p. 12 et seq.; D. KOCHENOV, On Tiles and Pillars: EU Citizenship as a Federal Denom-
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the law collides with another constitutional principle of EU law. The principle of confer-
ral implies that some competences are conferred to the EU and others are retained by 
the Member States.8 This means that the legal position of citizens differs, depending on 
whether they are subject to national or European rules. This differentiation may cause 
inequality.9 Because of its unique position at the intersection of free movement, immi-
gration policy, fundamental rights, limited Union competence, and political controversy, 
family reunification is one of the areas of the law in which this differentiation occurs.10 
Family reunification in the EU is defined as the situation in which a third-country na-
tional family member of a resident of one of the Member States acquires a residence 
title to reside with the resident who is already legally in the EU.11 The resident can ei-
ther be a third-country national or an EU citizen. This Article only examines family reuni-
fication between third-country nationals and EU citizens. The legal regime for family re-
unification between third-country nationals who are legally residing in the EU and their 
third-country national family members is not discussed.12 
Directive 2004/38 regulates the right of EU citizens and their family members to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. EU citizens who move 
to or reside in a Member State of which they are not a national benefit from its protec-
tion, which includes the possibility for family reunification under very lenient condi-
tions.13 Family reunification between third-country nationals and EU citizens who do not 
move to or reside in a Member State of which they are not a national is regulated by the 
Member State of which the EU citizens is a national. Some Member States impose re-
quirements for family reunification for their own nationals that are far stricter than the 
 
inator, in D. KOCHENOV (ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017, pp. 1 et seq., pp. 5, 9; G. DE BÚRCA, The Role of Equality in European Community 
Law, in A. DASHWOOD, S. O’LEARY (eds), The Principle of Equal Treatment in EC Law, London: Sweet & Max-
well, 1997, p. 16; T.H. MARSHALL, Citizenship and Social Class, London: Pluto Press, 1992. 
8 Art. 4, para. 1, and Art. 5, paras 1-2, TEU and Arts 2-6 TFEU. 
9 S. GARBEN, I. GOVAERE, The Division of Competences Between the EU and the Member States Reflec-
tions on the Past, the Present and the Future, in S. GARBEN, I. GOVAERE (eds), The Division of Competences 
Between the EU and the Member States Reflections on the Past, the Present and the Future, Oxford: Hart, 
2017, p. 3 et seq.; A. TRYFONIDOU, Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., p. 6.  
10 J. FAULL, Prohibition of Abuse of Law: A New General Principle of EU Law, in R. DE LA FERIA, S. 
VOGENAUER (eds), Prohibition of Abuse of Law. A New General Principle of EU Law?, Oxford: Hart, 2011, p. 
291 et seq., especially p. 293.  
11 The term “third-country national” refers to anyone who does not have the nationality of one of the 
Member States. 
12 Third-country national residents in the EU can rely on Directive 2003/86/EC of the Council of 22 
September 2003 on the right to family reunification. 
13 When an EU citizen resides in a Member State in compliance with Directive 2004/38, his family 
members can join him without the need to fulfill any conditions, except for the obligation to have health 
insurance. See Art. 7 of Directive 2004/38, cit. 
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requirements EU law imposes on EU citizens who exercise their free movements 
rights.14 This phenomenon is called reverse discrimination.15 
When a national of a Member State cannot comply with the strict conditions for 
family reunification in national law, EU law allows to circumvent these national rules by 
moving to another Member State. He will then fall within the more lenient regime for 
family reunification that is provided by EU law. Case-law of the Court of Justice provides, 
moreover, that upon return to the home Member State of the EU citizen (in a return sit-
uation), his family members retain their residence rights. The only condition to retain 
these rights is that residence in the host Member State must have been genuine. If that 
is the case, the family member does not need to comply with the conditions for family 
reunification that are posed by the national law of that Member State.16 The ability to 
 
14 See U. NEERGAARD, C. JACQUESON, N. HOLST-CHRISTENSEN (eds), Union Citizenship: Development Impact 
and Challenges. The XXVI FIDE Congress in Copenhagen, Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing, 2014, 
fide2014.eu; A. TRYFONIDOU, Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., p. 120 et seq.; V. VERBIST, Reverse Dis-
crimination in the European Union: A Recurring Balancing Act, Cambridge: Intersentia, 2017, p. 4 et seq., 
39 et seq.; C. BERNERI, Family Reunification in the EU, cit., p. 7. 
15 A. TRYFONIDOU, Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., p. 13 et seq., p. 117 et seq.; V. VERBIST, Reverse 
Discrimination in the European Union, cit., p. 3 et seq.; G. DAVIES, Nationality Discrimination in the Euro-
pean Internal Market, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2003; M. POIARES MADURO, The Scope 
of European Remedies: The Case of Purely Internal Situations and Reverse Discrimination, in C. KILPATRICK, 
T. NOVITZ, P. SKIDMORE (eds), The Future of European Remedies, London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2000; P. 
VAN ELSUWEGE, D. KOCHENOV, On the Limits of Judicial Intervention: EU Citizenship and Family Reunification 
Rights, in European Journal of Migration and Law, 2011, p. 443 et seq.; A. TRYFONIDOU, Reverse Discrimina-
tion in Purely Internal Situations: An Incongruity in a Citizens’ Europe, in Legal Issues of Economic Integra-
tion, 2008, p. 43 et seq.; D. HANF, Reverse Discrimination in EU Law: Constitutional Aberration, Constitu-
tional Necessity, or Judicial Choice?, in Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2011, p. 29 
et seq.; H. OOSTEROM-STAPLES, To What Extent Has Reverse Discrimination Been Reversed?, in European 
Journal of Migration and Law, 2012, p. 151 et seq.; K. GROENENDIJK, Reverse Discrimination, Family Reunifi-
cation and Union Citizens of Immigrant Origin, in E. GUILD, C.G. ROTAECHE, D. KOSTAKOPOULOU (eds), The Re-
conceptualization of European Union Citizenship, Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014, p. 
169 et seq.; S. O’LEARY, The Past, Present and Future of the Purely Internal Rule in EU Law, in Irish Jurist, 
pp. 13-46; E. SPAVENTA, Seeing the Wood Despite the Trees, On the Scope of Union Citizenship and Its Con-
stitutional Effects, in Common Market Law Review, 2009, p. 13; C. COSTELLO, Citizenship of the Union: 
Above Abuse?, in R. DE LA FERIA, S. VOGENAUER (eds), Prohibition of Abuse of Law, cit., p. 321 et seq. 
16 Court of Justice: judgment of 7 July 1992, case C-370/90, Singh; judgment of 23 September 2003, 
case C-109/01, Akrich; judgment of 11 December 2007, case C-291/05, Eind [GC]; judgment of 25 July 
2008, case C-127/08, Metock and Others [GC]; judgment of 12 March 2014, case C-456/12, O. and B. [GC], 
paras 51-61; judgment of 5 June 2018, case C-673/16, Coman and Others [GC], paras 24, 40, 51-53; judg-
ment of 12 July 2018, case C-89/17, Banger; P. WATSON, Free Movement of Workers – A One Way Ticket? 
Case C-370/90 The Queen v. Immigation Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh, in Industrial Law Journal, 
1993, p. 68 et seq.; J. BIERBACH, Court of Justice of the European Communities. The Return of the Member 
State National and the Destiny of the European Citizen. Grand Chamber Decision of 11 December 2007, 
Case C-291/05. Minister Voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie v. R.N.G. Eind, in European Constitution-
al Law Review, 2008, p. 344 et seq.; J. BIERBACH, European Citizens’ Third-Country Family Members and 
Community Law, in European Constitutional Law Review, 2008, p. 344 et seq.; C. COSTELLO, Metock: Free 
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circumvent national legislation on family reunification by acquiring residence rights in 
another Member State and then return with them without intervention of national law17 
is called the “Europe-route”.18 The availability of the Europe-route empowers EU citizens 
to change the legal regime that applies to them and thereby partly remedies the ine-
quality that exists between EU citizens that benefit from EU law and those who do not. 
Thereby it could offer a form of reconciliation for reverse discrimination. At the same 
time, however, the availability of the Europe-route curtails the competence of the 
Member States to regulate the position of their own nationals.19 To prevent express cir-
cumvention of applicable national immigration law through use of the Europe-route, 
Member States have the possibility to classify the use of EU rights as abuse of law and 
refuse or withdraw the residence rights EU citizens’ family members derive thereof.20 At 
the same time, the legitimate concern of Member States to avoid circumvention of their 
national laws can be contrasted with the individual’s wish to live together with his fami-
ly, which is protected by human rights law. The European Convention of Human Rights 
 
Movement and “Normal Family Life” in the Union, in Common Market Law Review, 2009, p. 587 et seq.; N. 
CAMBIEN, Case C-127/08, Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Re-
form, in Columbia Journal of European Law, 2009, p. 321 et seq.; E. SPAVENTA, Family Rights for Circular 
Migrants and Frontier Workers: O and B, and S and G, in Common Market Law Review, 2015, p. 753 et 
seq.; H. VAN EIJKEN, De Zaken S. en G. & O. en B.: Grenzeloze Gezinnen en Afgeleide Verblijfsrechten, in Ne-
derlands Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht, 2014, p. 319 et seq. 
17 J. FAULL, Prohibition of Abuse of Law, cit., p. 291 et seq., especially p. 293; C. COSTELLO, Citizenship of 
the Union, cit., p. 321 et seq.; K. GROENENDIJK, Reverse Discrimination, Family Reunification and Union Citi-
zens of Immigrant Origin, cit., p. 169 et seq.; A. TRYFONIDOU, Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., p. 117 
et seq. Circumvention of EU law may also be relevant when national law does not allow for gay marriage. 
In Coman and Others [GC], cit., the Court decided that gay marriage and the pertaining rights that are 
obtained in another Member State can also be brought back to the home Member State, thereby evading 
the impossibility of gay marriage that exists in some Member States. See: A. TRYFONIDOU, Free Movement 
of Same-sex Spouses Within the EU: The ECJ’s Coman Judgment, in European Law Blog, 19 June 2018, eu-
ropeanlawblog.eu; B. SAFRADIN, H. KROEZE, Een Overwinning voor vrij Verkeersrechten van Regenboogfami-
lies in Europa: Het Langverwachte Coman Arrest, in Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht, 2019, 
forthcoming. A precondition that is set to bring rights back home is that residence in the host Member 
State has been genuine. See O. and B. [GC] cit., paras 51-61 and Coman and Others [GC], cit., paras 24, 
40, 51-53. 
18 Member States did not receive this decrease in their competence with open arms, and a discourse 
arose about “closing the Europe-route”. In this discourse it is suggested that (purposeful) circumvention 
of national family reunification rules by temporarily moving to another Member States to fall within the 
application of the more lenient EU law on family reunification should be a ground to refuse the rights that 
are pursued. Most notably in the Netherlands. See Parliamentary Document 29 700, Amendment of the 
Immigration Law 2000 with regard to the integration requirement, no. 31: Letter from the Minister for 
Immigration and Integration to the Parliament, zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl. Also see: C. COSTELLO, 
Metock, cit., p. 587 et seq. 
19 And it makes less favorable treatment of nationals who cannot bring themselves within the scope 
of EU law even more pronounced. See the argument below. 
20 Art. 35 of Directive 2004/38, cit.; Singh, cit., para. 24, see infra; E. GUILD, S. PEERS, J. TOMKIN, The EU 
Citizenship Directive: A Commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 296 et seq. 
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protects the right to family life and the right to marry. These rights are not absolute and 
do not impose “a general obligation […] to respect the choice by married couples of the 
country of their matrimonial residence or to authorise family reunification on its territo-
ry”.21 Yet, since the beginning of the 21st century, the European Court of Human Rights 
demonstrated a “readiness to extend the protective reach of Article 8 [of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)] in the field of immigration”.22 In light of this para-
digm of protection of the family, it is uncomfortable in itself that the EU legal system is 
so fragmented that EU citizens are in need of circumventing their national laws to be 
together with their loved ones in the first place.23 A tension exists between the citizen’s 
right to love,24 and the Member State’s “right to control the entry of non-nationals into 
its territory”.25 In addition, abuse of law is defined as a situation in which the conditions 
to acquire a right are formally fulfilled, but despite thereof the right is refused because 
the conduct that led to conferral of the right does not meet the purpose for which the 
right was conferred.26 Refusing those rights by asserting that they were abused may be 
contrary to the principle of legal certainty.27 In the interest of legal certainty, and in the 
interest of the individual’s right to love and live with his family, it is, therefore, necessary 
to carefully delineate the scope of application of abuse of law in the context of EU fami-
 
21 European Court of Human Rights: judgment of 28 May 1985, nos 9214/80, 9473/81 and 9474/81, 
Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, para. 68; judgment of 31 January 2006, no. 
50435/99, Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands, para. 39; judgment of 3 October 2014, 
no. 12738/10, Jeunesse v. The Netherlands, para. 107. 
22 D. THYM, Respect for Private and Family Life Under Article 8 ECHR in Immigration Cases: A Human 
Right to Regularize Illegal Stay?, in International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 2008, p. 87 et seq., p. 111; 
e.g. European Court of Human Rights: judgment of 21 December 2001, no. 31465/96, Sen v. the Nether-
lands; judgment of 1 December 2005, no. 60665/00, Tuquabo-Tekle et al v. the Netherlands.  
23 Much can be said about this perspective. One insight is that EU law is an institute of exclusion, be-
cause it only privileges the “good citizens” who add to the establishment of the internal market. D. 
KOCHENOV, On Tiles and Pillars, cit., pp. 59-62; L. AZOULAI, Transfiguring European Citizenship: From Mem-
ber State Territory to Union Territory, in D. KOCHENOV (ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism, cit., p. 178 et 
seq.; E. SPAVENTA, Earned Citizenship – Understanding Union Citizenship Through Its Scope, in D. KOCHENOV 
(ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism, cit., p. 220 et seq.; C. O’BRIEN, Unity in Adversity: EU Citizenship, So-
cial Justice and the Cautionary Tale of the UK, London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017. Also see: S. IGLESIAS 
SÁNCHEZ, A Citizenship Right to Stay? The Right Not to Move in a Union Based on Free Movement, in D. 
KOCHENOV (ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism, cit., p. 371 et seq. 
24 A.M. D’AOUST, Love as Project of (Im)Mobility: Love, Sovereignty and Governmentality in Marriage 
Migration Management Practices, in Global Society, 2014, p. 317 et seq.; K.L. KARST, The Freedom of Inti-
mate Association, in The Yale Law Journal, 1980, p. 624 et seq. 
25 Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, cit., para. 67; Rodrigues da Silva and 
Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands, cit., para. 39; Jeunesse v. The Netherlands, cit., para. 107. 
26 K.S. ZIEGLER, Abuse of Law in the Context of the Free Movement of Workers, in R. DE LA FERIA, S. 
VOGENAUER (eds), Prohibition of Abuse of Law, cit., p. 296. See infra.  
27 K.S. ZIEGLER, Abuse of Law in the Context of the Free Movement of Workers, cit., p. 295 et seq., es-
pecially p. 296; M. POIARES MADURO, Foreword, in R. DE LA FERIA, S. VOGENAUER (eds), Prohibition of Abuse of 
Law, cit., p. vii. 
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ly reunification, which is the main purpose of this Article. The outcome of this research 
is also important for Member States, because by determining the width of the scope of 
EU law, the remaining discretionary competence that is left to the Member States also 
becomes clearer.28 When abuse of law is given a broad interpretation, Member States 
can more easily rely on it and have more leeway in enforcing their national rules at the 
expense of limiting the rights that derive from EU law. Conversely, when abuse of law is 
given a narrow interpretation, it is more difficult for Member States to rely on it and is 
more difficult to take away EU rights. A broad interpretation of abuse of law thus fa-
vours Member States’ interests in protecting their competence to regulate the legal po-
sition of their nationals, and a narrow interpretation favours the effectiveness of EU 
law, and the individual’s right to love and live with his family. 
This research addresses abuse of EU law in the context of family reunification be-
tween a third-country national and an EU citizen to acquire a residence right. Two types 
of possible abuse are considered, the conclusion of marriages of convenience and the 
circumvention of national law through use of the Europe-route. Both types of conduct 
are aimed at bringing a case of immigration or family reunification within the scope of 
EU law to benefit from a more lenient immigration/family reunification regime. Social 
welfare tourism as a form of abuse of free movement law is excluded from the analysis, 
with the exception of those cases that are conducive to understanding the concept of 
abuse of law in the context of family reunification.29 
The possibility for Member States to refuse a residence right in cases of abuse of EU 
law is laid down in Art. 3 of Directive 2004/38. Aside from abuse of rights, this provision 
mentions fraud as a reason to refuse, terminate or withdraw rights. It is, therefore, rel-
evant to explain the distinction between fraud and abuse of law, before proceeding to 
the analysis of abuse of law in itself. Abuse of law or abuse of rights30 refers to “an arti-
ficial conduct entered into solely with the purpose of obtaining the right of free move-
ment and residence under Community law which, albeit formally observing of the con-
ditions laid down by Community rules, does not comply with the purpose of those 
rules”.31 Fraud, on the other hand, “may be defined as deliberate deception or contriv-
ance made to obtain the right of free movement and residence under the Directive. In 
the context of the Directive, fraud is likely to be limited to forgery of documents or false 
representation of a material fact concerning the conditions attached to the right of res-
 
28 A. TRYFONIDOU, Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., p. 7. 
29 K.S. ZIEGLER, Abuse of Law in the Context of the Free Movement of Workers, cit., p. 295 et seq., es-
pecially p. 300 et seq.; S.A. MANTU, P.E. MINDERHOUD, Exploring the Limits of Social Solidarity. Welfare Tour-
ism and EU Citizenship, in UNIO – EU Law Journal, 2016, p. 4 et seq. 
30 Abuse of law and abuse of rights are used interchangeable in this Article. 
31 Communication COM(2009) 313 final of 2 July 2009 from the Commission on the application of Di-
rective 2004/38, p. 15, point 4.1.2; Court of Justice: judgment of 14 December 2000, case C-110/99, 
Emsland-Stärke, para. 52 et seq.; judgment of 9 March 1999, case C-212/97, Centros, para. 25. 
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idence”.32 Therefore, the difference between fraud and abuse is that in case of abuse, 
the conditions for acquiring a right are fulfilled, whilst in the case of fraud, information 
is falsified to make it seem like they are fulfilled when they are not. This Article only 
deals with abuse of law and not with fraud. 
The first part of the Article will introduce the legal and political context in which re-
verse discrimination, in the context of family reunification and abuse, as an instrument 
to nullify resulting rights, operates. Particular attention will be given to the federalist-
citizenship contraposition that is apparent in the EU constitutional struggle and mitigat-
ed by the introduction of the concept of abuse of law. This part will also explore the role 
of the ECHR as a complementary source of protection when situations fall outside the 
scope of EU law. The second part of this Article addresses the Member States’ concern 
about circumvention of their national immigration laws. To deal with this circumven-
tion, they may classify the use of free movement rights as abuse of EU law and refuse 
or withdraw residence rights that are derived thereof. Doing so, however, may com-
promise legal certainty. The second part of the Article is, therefore, devoted to identify-
ing the delineation of the scope of application of abuse of law in a family reunification 
context. In doing so, the Article inquires what the concept means, how it is applied and 
understood, and what it means for judicial protection of European citizens and for legal 
certainty. In the last section, ultimately, the distinction between abuse of law and non-
compliance with the applicable conditions for family reunification is elaborated upon. 
The importance of the research is to add to the understanding of abuse of law in a 
family reunification context and to inquire about its implications for legal certainty and 
judicial protection in the EU. Additionally, the research aims to position the theme of 
reverse discrimination in a broader constitutional context. 
II. Reverse discrimination: colliding constitutional principles in EU 
law 
It can be deduced from the text of the Treaties,33 and many sources of secondary law, 
that European law-makers in the past and in the present have attached great im-
portance to equality in EU law.34 In fact, it is considered to be “one of the fundamental 
values people throughout Europe can agree upon” as a result of a “longstanding tradi-
 
32 Communication COM(2009) 313, cit., p. 15, point 4.1.1; Court of Justice: judgment of 5 June 1997, 
case C-285/95, Kol v. Land Berlin, para. 29; judgment of 27 September 2001, case C-63/99, Gloszczuk, pa-
ra. 75; K.S. ZIEGLER, Abuse of Law in the Context of the Free Movement of Workers, cit., p. 295 et seq., es-
pecially p. 296. 
33 E.g. Art. 2 TEU; Art. 18 TFEU; Title III on Equality, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (Charter). 
34 J. CROON-GESTEFELD, Reconceptualising European Equality Law, cit., p. 1 et seq.; A. TRYFONIDOU, Re-
verse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., pp. 162-166. 
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tion of egalitarian discourse […] on the old continent”.35 “As a consequence, European 
equality law opens up a space in which European citizens feel included in the broader 
integration project”.36 Citizenship as the manifestation of equality may, however, collide 
with other constitutional principles of the EU, which as an international organization 
goes further than merely intergovernmental cooperation and very much resembles a 
federalist entity.37 Upholding the federal balance requires a compromise between the 
need of the EU to have sufficient competences to achieve the common goals for which 
it was established, and preserving the sovereignty of its Member States.38 The compe-
tences of the EU are, therefore, limited by the principle of conferral, which is translated 
into the division of competences.39 Through this principle, the EU is shaped into a type 
of multi-level governance system, which pursues an optimal allocation of regulatory 
competences. Allocation of these competences is directed by the principle of subsidiari-
ty, which means that competences are exercised at the level of government that is best 
positioned to regulate a specific issue. The EU may only intervene if it is able to act 
more effectively than the Member States at their respective national or local levels.40 
Contrary to the notion of equal citizenship, the division of competences implies the 
possibility of unequal treatment among citizens, because the rules that are applicable 
to an individual may vary according to the level of governance where the competence to 
regulate the situation rests. The attachment of European decision-makers to equality 
does not preclude differentiation, since “the simple fact that we may agree that equality 
takes up a prominent place in European law tells us little about its functioning or how 
we should evaluate its application”.41 Its functioning seems to be limited to the protec-
tion of equality within a legal regime – either in the EU or in a Member State – without 
real consideration for the differences that exist between these legal regimes. Thus, a 
tension exists between equal citizenship and the division of competences. In the EU this 
 
35 J. CROON-GESTEFELD, Reconceptualising European Equality Law, cit., p. 3. 
36 Ibid., p. 1 et seq. (citations on p. 3). 
37 D. KOCHENOV, On Tiles and Pillars, cit., p. 1 et seq., especially pp. 16-35; N. NIC SHUIBHNE, Recasting 
EU Citizenship as Federal Citizenship: What Are the Implications for the Citizen When the Polity Bargain Is 
Privileged?, in D. KOCHENOV (ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism, cit., p. 147 et seq., especially p. 148; T.D. 
ZWEIFEL, Democratic Deficit?: Institutions and Regulation in the European Union, Switzerland, and the 
United States in Comparative Perspective, Oxford: Lexington Books, 2002; A. MENON, M. SCHAIN, Compara-
tive Federalism: The European Union and the United States in Comparative Perspective, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006; K. LENAERTS, Federalism: Essential Concepts in Evolution, in Fordham International 
Law Journal, 1997, p. 746 et seq. 
38 N. NIC SHUIBHNE, Recasting EU Citizenship as Federal Citizenship, cit., p. 147 et seq., especially p. 
149; K. LENAERTS, Federalism, cit., p. 746 et seq., especially p. 775. 
39 Arts 4, para. 1, and 5, paras. 1-2, TEU, Arts 2-6 TFEU. 
40 Art. 5, para. 3, TEU; Protocol no. 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and propor-
tionality; R. SCHÜTZE, Subsidiarity After Lisbon: Reinforcing the Safeguards of Federalism?, in The Cam-
bridge Law Journal, 2009, pp. 525-536. 
41 J. CROON-GESTEFELD, Reconceptualising European Equality Law, cit., p. 2. 
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tension is particularly noticeable when EU citizens who reside in their own Member 
State and do not fall within the scope of EU law enjoy less protection than those who 
reside in a Member State of which they are not a national. The occurrence of this ine-
quality causes the reverse discrimination, which was mentioned in the introduction.42 
“Reverse” means that the group that is being discriminated against is an unexpected 
group, which is treated less favourably in comparison with another group which nor-
mally would receive the inferior treatment.43 More specifically, it is normally expected 
that “insiders” enjoy more privileges than “outsiders”, but when citizens are reversely 
discriminated, the opposite situation exists.44 
Reverse discrimination occurs  
“due to the fact that, in order to further the Community’s central aim of establishing a 
common market, [EU] law […] grants rights to [persons] that fall within its scope by virtue 
of their contribution to the construction of the internal market, that are more generous 
or flexible than those that are provided by national laws to persons […] that are deemed 
to fall within the scope of application of national law, as a result of the application of the 
purely internal rule. […] Accordingly, there may be a difference in treatment”.45 
In other words, because the EU originated from an economic rationale, the Union’s 
competence only extends to the legal position of EU citizens who move between Mem-
ber States, because they contribute to the establishment of the internal market.46 Pure-
 
42 A. TRYFONIDOU, Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., pp. 13-18; V. VERBIST, Reverse Discrimination 
in the European Union, cit., pp. 3-10; G. DAVIES, Nationality Discrimination in the European Internal Mar-
ket, cit.; M. POIARES MADURO, The Scope of European Remedies, cit.; P. VAN ELSUWEGE, D. KOCHENOV, On the 
Limits of Judicial Intervention, cit.; A. TRYFONIDOU, Reverse Discrimination in Purely Internal Situations, cit.; 
D. HANF, Reverse Discrimination in EU Law: Constitutional Aberration, Constitutional Necessity, or Judicial 
Choice?, cit.; H. OOSTEROM-STAPLES, To What Extent Has Reverse Discrimination Been Reversed?, cit.; K. 
GROENENDIJK, Reverse Discrimination, Family Reunification and Union Citizens of Immigrant Origin, cit.; S. 
O’LEARY, The Past, Present and Future of the Purely Internal Rule in EU Law, cit.; E. SPAVENTA, Seeing the 
Wood Despite the Trees, cit.; C. COSTELLO, Citizenship of the Union, cit. 
43 A. TRYFONIDOU, Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., pp. 3, 14; V. VERBIST, Reverse Discrimination in 
the European Union, cit., p. 3. 
44 J.H. CARENS, The Ethics of Immigration, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 185 et seq. 
45 A. TRYFONIDOU, Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., p. 14.  
46 Ibid., p. 7, 129 et seq., p. 166; V. VERBIST, Reverse Discrimination in the European Union, cit., pp. 69-70; 
P.J. NEUVONEN, Equal Citizenship and Its Limits in EU Law: We the Burden?, London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 
2016, p. 15 et seq.; N. NIC SHUIBHNE, The Resilience of EU Market Citizenship, in Common Market Law Review, 
2010, p. 1597, especially p. 1614; C. DAUTRICOURT, S. THOMAS, Reverse Discrimination and Free Movement of 
Persons Under Community Law: All for Ulysses, Nothing for Penelope?, in European Law Review, 2009, pp. 
454, 436; S. O’LEARY, The Past, Present and Future of the Purely Internal Rule in EU Law, cit., p. 13 et seq.; N. 
NIC SHUIBHNE, Free Movement of Persons and the Wholly Internal Rule: Time to Move On, in Common Market 
Law Review, 2002, p. 731. An exception to this economic rationale for conferring family reunification rights 
seems to have emerged in the Ruiz Zambrano case-law, in which a residence right was granted to the 
Colombian parents of Belgian children by virtue of them being an EU citizen and enjoying the right to reside, 
rather than contributing to the economic objectives of the internal market. To discuss these rights falls 
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ly internal situations, which are confined in all relevant aspects to a single Member 
States, on the other hand, fall outside the scope of EU law.47 
The purpose of introducing the right to family reunification as an ancillary to free 
movement rights was to facilitate the movement that would contribute to the estab-
lishment of the internal market. Not being able to bring one’s family was considered to 
be an obstacle to move, and removing that obstacle by facilitating family reunification 
was expected to increase the chance that workers and self-employed would go abroad. 
Moreover, it was thought that being able to enjoy family life in the host country would 
diminish the need to retain strong ties to the home Member State, which would stimu-
late integration in the host Member State and, again, facilitate free movement.48 Na-
tionals who resided in their own Member State, on the other hand, did not contribute to 
the establishment of the internal market. They were thus not protected by EU law and 
not eligible for the family reunification rights guaranteed by EU free movement law. Ad-
ditionally, it was assumed they did not need EU law protection to secure their right to 
reside and work, because by virtue of their national citizenship they already enjoy those 
rights indiscriminately.49 The rights that were provided to them by national law did not 
always, however, include a right to family reunification that was comparable to the 
equivalent right in EU law. As a result, when the national legislation that applies to these 
citizens offers other or less rights than EU law does, they are reversely discriminated in 
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nal Rule in EU Law, cit., p. 13 et seq.; N. NIC SHUIBHNE, Free Movement of Persons and the Wholly Internal 
Rule, cit., p. 731. 
48 C. BERNERI, Family Reunification in the EU, cit., p. 8; P. BOELES, M. DEN HEIJER, G. LODDER, K. WOUTERS, 
European Migration Law, cit., p. 30; A. TRYFONIDOU, Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., p. 96 et seq.; 
Recitals 18, 23-24 of the Preamble of Directive 2004/38, cit. 
49 Court of Justice, judgment of 5 May 2011, case C-434/09, McCarthy, paras 28-29; O. and B. [GC], 
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mental Freedoms securing certain rights and freedoms other than those already included in the Conven-
tion and in the First Protocol thereto. 
1220 Hester Kroeze 
comparison with nationals from other Member States who do benefit from EU law for 
the purpose of family reunification.50 
In general, Member States do not “want to discriminate against their own nation-
als”, but reverse discrimination occurs “because [Union] law obliges States to treat na-
tionals of other Member States in a way which – by reasons of their own policies and 
aims – they did not originally intend to treat their own nationals”.51 Thus, when national 
legislation infringes EU free movement law, it must only be set aside for EU citizens 
who, by virtue of their movement to another Member State, fall within the scope of EU 
law. Nationals of the concerned Member State who did not make use of free movement 
rights, on the other hand, fall outside the protection of EU law, so to them the national 
legislation continues to apply and as a result they are reversely discriminated. “Reverse 
discrimination is [thus] a side effect of the limited scope of application of EU law”.52 In 
other cases, reverse discrimination may be “a deliberate choice of the national legislator 
to (continue to) apply stricter conditions to purely internal situations in order to pursue 
their own national policy”.53 For family reunification, this deliberate choice is made by 
several of the Member States, including Belgium and the Netherlands.54 
The viability of continuing to uphold the economic premises on which the EU was 
built and to continue to allow the existence of reverse discrimination can be ques-
tioned, of course, and if the EU does not start to prioritize the inclusion of its citizens 
more than it does now, its legitimacy may be seriously undermined.55 At the same time, 
the EU Treaties provide constitutional protection to EU citizenship and the principle of 
equality, as well as to the division of competences. Reconciliation of these principles 
should, therefore, take place within the boundaries of those Treaties, within the EU’s 
constitutional system. In exploring possible reconciliation, some scholars have exam-
ined whether reverse discrimination should fall within the scope of Art. 18 TFEU, which 
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51 M. POIARES MADURO, The Scope of European Remedies, cit., p. 127; V. VERBIST, Reverse Discrimina-
tion in the European Union, cit., p. 4. 
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54 Ibid. 
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prohibits discrimination on the grounds of nationality.56 The Court of Justice rejected 
this possibility, however, because the difference in treatment did not constitute “an ob-
stacle to the construction of the internal market”.57 
An alternative option for reconciliation could be that reverse discrimination can ex-
ist within reasonable boundaries of equality. These reasonable boundaries are not to 
be considered as fixed limits to reverse discrimination that should be enforced by the 
EU or its Member States, but as a balancing exercise that mitigates some of the inequal-
ity that is caused by the system without defying the division of competences. In this 
way, a solution could be found in finding “a way around” reverse discrimination and be-
come more equal, so to say. For family reunification rights, the Court seems to have 
adopted such an approach in its case-law.58 It did so, for instance, by making the enti-
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ered on 30 September 2010, case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano, paras 123-150; E. SPAVENTA, From Gebhard to 
Carpenter: Towards a (Non-)Economic European Constitution, in Common Market Law Review, 2004, p. 
743 et seq., especially p. 771; E. SPAVENTA, Earned Citizenship, cit., p. 204 et seq., especially p. 204; E. 
SPAVENTA, Seeing the Wood Despite the Trees?, cit., pp. 13-45; J. NEUVONEN, Equal Citizenship and Its Limits 
in EU Law, cit., pp. 16-19; S. ADAM, P. VAN ELSUWEGE, Citizenship Rights and the Federal Balance Between 
the European Union and Its Member States: Comment on Dereci, in European Law Review, 2012, p. 176 
et seq., especially p. 188 et seq. 
57 Court of Justice: judgment of 18 February 1987, case 98/86, Ministére public v. Mathot, paras 7-8; 
judgment of 15 January 1986, case 44/84, Hurd v. Jones, paras 54-56; judgment of 23 October 1986, case 
355/85, Driancourt v. Cognet, paras 10-11; judgment of 16 June 1994, case C-132/93, Steen v. Deutsche 
Bundespost; judgment of 29 January 2004, case C-253/01, Krüger; A. TRYFONIDOU, Reverse Discrimination 
in EC Law, cit., p. 18 et seq.; V. VERBIST, Reverse Discrimination in the European Union, cit., p. 25 et seq.; P.J. 
NEUVONEN, Equal Citizenship and Its Limits in EU Law, cit., p. 16 et seq.; S. ADAM, P. VAN ELSUWEGE, Citizen-
ship Rights and the Federal Balance Between the European Union and Its Member States, cit., p. 188 et 
seq.; E. SPAVENTA, Earned Citizenship, cit., p. 204 et seq. The restricted applicability of Art. 18 TFEU is also 
mentioned in the provision itself, which limits its applicability to those cases that fall “within the scope of 
the Treaties”. See: P.J. NEUVONEN, Equal Citizenship and Its Limits in EU Law, cit., p. 18 et seq. 
58 Here I only discuss family reunification rights on the basis of Art. 21 TFEU and Directive 2004/38, 
cit. Family reunification rights derived from Art. 20 TFEU pursuant to the Ruiz Zambrano line of case-law 
is left out of the analysis. Ruiz Zambrano concerned a purely internal situation which was brought within 
the scope of EU law, because expulsion of the Colombian parents would force their Belgian children to 
leave the territory of the EU (in order to follow the parents), which would deprive them of the genuine 
enjoyment of the substance of the rights they enjoy by virtue of their citizenship. In literature it has been 
discussed extensively whether and to what extent the Art. 20 TFEU case-law could remedy the lack of pro-
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tlement to the status of a worker dependent on a communitarian concept of being a 
worker instead, which ruled out the relevance of national interpretations.59 Expanding 
the scope of the freedom of workers also expanded the scope of potential beneficiaries 
to the family reunification rights that are attached to the status of a worker. Similarly, 
the Court has always refused to introduce a fixed income requirement for family reuni-
fication. Instead, sufficient resources are assessed on a case-by-case basis.60 Additional-
ly, and most important for this Article is the earlier mentioned line of case-law which 
entails that when an EU citizen who has made use of the free movement of persons 
rights returns to his home Member State, the situation is no longer considered purely 
internal and is brought within the scope of Union law. The benefit that stems from con-
tinuing to fall within the scope of EU law is that EU citizens’ family members who ac-
quired a residence right in the host state can retain those rights when they return to the 
home Member State of their EU family member. The only condition to retain these 
rights is that residence in the host Member State must have been genuine.61 If that is 
the case, the family member does not need to comply with the conditions for family re-
unification that are posed by the national law of that Member State.62 The case-law is 
motivated by the same economic discourse on which European integration was built, 
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and in essence, entails that effectively exercising economic freedoms also implies the 
possibility to rely on EU law upon return to the home Member State. Safeguarding the 
effectiveness of EU law is critical because otherwise an individual could be deterred 
from using his rights in the first place.63 
The case-law of the Court empowers individual citizens to bring themselves within the 
scope of EU law and benefit from more lenient rules applicable to family reunification, 
and can, thus, be considered as a form of reconciliation for those who are reversely dis-
criminated. At the same time, this reconciliation requires movement to another Member 
State which can be unaffordable (due to finances or language barriers), in particular, be-
cause residence in the host state must be genuine before rights can be retained in the 
home Member State.64 This means that EU citizenship and the pertaining family reunifica-
tion rights are reserved for the privileged “good” citizens who can afford to move and thus 
contribute to the internal market.65 Another issue that is revealed when the scope of EU 
law is enhanced, is that it becomes increasingly difficult to justify why some citizens are 
still not included.66 It is acknowledged that the approximation of legal regimes and the 
empowerment of citizens is limited and compromised by these liabilities but it may be as 
much as is feasible within the constitutional limitations of EU law. Further remedies to re-
verse discrimination should then come from the legislator and ultimately from the Mem-
ber States.67 They should take their responsibility in the EU as a co-legislator in the Coun-
cil of Ministers or – when the EU lacks the competence to do so – outside the EU by resolv-
ing reverse discrimination on the basis of national law. Some of the Member States such 
as France, Italy and Austria, indeed, assumed this responsibility when their respective na-
tional courts decided that the principle of equality, that is protected by their own constitu-
tion, prohibits reverse discrimination.68 This approach has led to the extended application 
of EU law to those situations, on the basis of national law. The solution does not eliminate 
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the purely internal rule but it does eliminate reverse discrimination. It is called “voluntary 
adoption”, “spontaneous harmonization” or “renvoi”.69 
Another component of the protection of the family that mustn’t be forgotten, lastly, 
is the protection of Art. 8 ECHR. The Court of Justice recalled in its case-law that if EU 
law does not provide entitlement to a residence right “regard must be had to respect 
for family life under Article 8” of the ECHR.70 As was mentioned in the introduction, the 
protection of family life does not give an entitlement to choose the country of matrimo-
nial residence.71 Quite the opposite, the ECHR is intentionally silent on matters of immi-
gration. Admission to a Member State can, therefore, only be examined “through the 
effects of state measures on other human rights of the foreigners concerned”.72 In addi-
tion, the Member States are awarded a margin of appreciation in their decision-making. 
As a result, the European Court of Human Rights only examines whether the decision 
was reasonable, and does not go into the choices of national policy, which are made by 
the Member States.73 Nevertheless, the Court shows a readiness to “correct intolerable 
outcomes in individual cases”,74 which gives an alternative prospect to those who do 
not and cannot benefit from EU law for the purpose of family reunification.75 
III. Abuse of EU law – definition and background 
Since 1974, the concept of law abuse is part of EU law.76 Its coming into being was in-
spired by the use of the concept in some of the Member States, even though, not all 
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Member States are familiar with it in the same way.77 As was mentioned above, abuse 
of law was introduced to resolve some of the tension between the effective use of EU 
law and judicial protection of those who use it while maintaining the preservation of the 
Member States’ competence to regulate internal situations. This helps to distinguish be-
tween genuine use of EU law within the limits that are set by the Court of Justice and 
use of EU law that is meant to circumvent national law, which is, therefore, not a genu-
ine use of EU rights. Member States’ reliance on abuse of law thus protects the division 
of competences in a sensitive area of law. Nevertheless, applying abuse of law in an EU 
context also causes the restriction of EU rights. Therefore, invoking abuse of law is de-
pendent on the scope of interpretation of abuse of law that is given by the Court of Jus-
tice. When EU rights are constructed and interpreted extensively by the Court, it is more 
difficult for the Member States to invoke abuse of law, even when their national laws 
are being circumvented. When these rights are more narrowly defined by the Court, it is 
easier to invoke abuse of law to restrict rights that go beyond their original purpose.78 
In other words, the broader the interpretation of EU free movement law, the less discre-
tion there is to rely on abuse of law for the Member States and vice versa.79 
This sensitivity is reflected in the development of the principle of abuse in EU law. In 
the course of the relevant case-law on abuse of law, a paradigm-shift can be observed 
from the essential purpose towards the sole purpose doctrine. The first doctrine entails 
that when the essential reason to invoke Union law does not tally with its purpose, this 
is classified as abuse of law, regardless of whether an additional legitimate purpose – 
which was not the essential purpose – for invoking the law can be found. Abuse of law 
is easily assumed.80 The sole purpose doctrine, on the other hand, entails that abuse of 
law can only be ascertained when there is no other objective distinguishable but the cir-
cumvention of national law.81 In that understanding of abuse of law, the mere fact that 
a person consciously places himself in a situation through which a certain right can be 
obtained does not in itself constitute sufficient basis to assume that there is an abuse of 
law.82 This doctrine is based on the notion that as long as a right is invoked in a genuine 
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and effective manner, there can be no abuse.83 Thus here, the scope of the concept’s 
applicability is narrow. 
The Court first introduced the concept of abuse of law in 1974 in Van Binsbergen. 
The case concerned a Dutch lawyer who wanted to circumvent the professional rules of 
conduct that were applicable to him in the Netherlands by establishing himself in Bel-
gium. Dutch law provided, however, that legal representatives should reside in the 
Netherlands. Van Binsbergen argued that this rule was contrary to the freedom to pro-
vide services. The Court of Justice did not follow this argument and ruled that “[a] Mem-
ber State cannot be denied the right to take measures to prevent the exercise by a per-
son providing services whose activity is entirely or principally directed towards its terri-
tory […] for the purpose of avoiding the professional rules of conduct which would be 
applicable to him if he were established within that state”.84 The formulation of the 
Court in Van Binsbergen seemed to award a broad discretion to the Member States, by 
implying that all circumvention of national rules could be contested and give reason to 
restrict the individual’s rights.85 
Van Binsbergen was followed by the so-called “Greek Challenge” cases. These cases 
concerned the reliance of shareholders of Greek public limited liability companies on 
Directive 77/91/EEC on the protection of their rights in the context of alterations in the 
capital of the company. The Greek government classified these claims as abuse of EU 
law, and the national courts asked for clarification from the Court of Justice. The Court 
of Justice considered that, despite the right of the Member States to combat abuse of 
law, reliance on this concept should not undermine the effectiveness and uniformity of 
EU law.86 Hence, the discretionary competence to apply abuse of law was restricted and 
the concept started to obtain a communitarian meaning. In Centros, the Court further 
restricted the Member States’ discretion to invoke abuse of law. The case concerned 
Danish entrepreneurs who established their company in the United Kingdom with the 
sole aim of avoiding Danish law on minimum capital.87 When the company wanted to 
open a branch in Denmark, the Danish authorities refused access to the Danish market, 
because according to them the company had abused EU law on freedom of establish-
ment. The Court decided differently and considered that the mere fact that a person 
consciously places himself in a situation through which a certain right can be obtained, 
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does not in itself constitute an abuse of law. The right to choose the Member State with 
the least restrictive company law to establish a company is “inherent in the exercise, in 
a single market, of the freedom of establishment guaranteed by the Treaty”.88 Similarly 
to Van Binsbergen, the company in Centros had made use of a U-turn construction to 
circumvent national law. Because the Court allowed this, it follows from its judgment 
that circumvention of national law does not always qualify as abuse of law.89 Where Van 
Binsbergen was an example of the essential purpose doctrine, with Centros the Court 
started to move towards a sole purpose doctrine. 
It also follows from Centros that a distinction is made between use and abuse of EU 
law. Use of EU law cannot lead to restriction of rights, whilst abuse can. The question 
arose how it is possible to distinguish between use and abuse of rights. The Court an-
swered this question in Emsland-Stärke, which can be used to determine whether a 
case can be classified as abuse of law. Like the earlier cases, Emsland-Stärke concerned 
a U-turn construction. The company exported a potato-based product from Germany to 
Switzerland for which it received an export refund. After the export, they immediately 
returned the products to Germany and sold them there. The question was whether this 
practice was abuse of EU law, which could justify the denial of the export refund. The 
Court considered: “A finding of abuse requires, first, a combination of objective circum-
stances in which, despite formal observance of the conditions laid down by the Com-
munity rules, the purpose of those rules has not been achieved. It requires, second, a 
subjective element consisting in the intention to obtain an advantage from the Com-
munity rules by creating artificially the conditions laid down for obtaining it”.90 By intro-
ducing this two-component test to assess possible abuse of law, the Court strongly re-
stricted the discretionary competence of the Member State to decide on the lawfulness 
of the use of EU law and gave the concept of abuse a communitarian meaning.91 
Emsland-Stärke was broadly discussed. The subjective element of the test was contest-
ed because of the difficulty to determine subjective intentions, and the question was 
asked whether Emsland-Stärke could be transposed to other fields of EU law.92 The 
Court responded to these questions and criticism in Halifax.93 This case concerned a 
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banking company whose financial services were tax-exempted. Accordingly, when the 
company established new call-centres, Halifax could only recover 5 per cent of the Val-
ue Added Tax (VAT) paid on the construction works. By developing a system of a series 
of transactions involving different companies of the Halifax group, it was, nevertheless, 
able to recover effectively the full amount of VAT. The question in this case was whether 
reliance on the right to deduct VAT, when the transactions on which the right was based 
were solely effected for that particular purpose, would be an abuse of rights. By apply-
ing the Emsland-Stärke test to the area of VAT, it was understood that the two-
components test would become the standardized test for abuse of law.94 Furthermore, 
Halifax seemed to respond to the criticism about the subjective element of the test by 
objectifying it. The Court considered: “An abusive practice will be found to exist where 
[…] it is apparent from a number of objective factors, such as the purely artificial nature 
of the transactions and the links between operators involved in the scheme, that the 
essential aim of those transactions concerned was to obtain a tax advantage”.95 
In Cadbury Schweppes, the Court extended the scope of application of the 
Emsland-Stärke test, again, to the field of corporate taxation. The case was similar to 
Centros and concerned a UK based company that exercised an economic activity on the 
Irish market. To counter tax-avoidance, the UK had established a tax on the income 
from Ireland, which was disputed before the Court of Justice. The Court reiterated the 
doctrine it had developed until then. It considered that nationals of a Member State are 
not supposed to “improperly circumvent national legislation” or “improperly or fraudu-
lently take advantage of provisions of Community law”. Yet, the establishment of a 
branch in another Member State “for the purpose of benefitting from the favourable 
tax regime […] does not in itself constitute abuse”.96 The freedom of establishment may, 
thus, only be restricted to prevent “wholly artificial arrangements”, equated with 
abuse.97 To establish the existence of a “wholly artificial arrangement”, the Emsland-
Stärke test should be applied.98 Cadbury Schweppes can be understood as another step 
of the Court from the essential purpose towards the sole purpose doctrine. This is be-
cause the existence of a purpose aside from constructing a “wholly artificial” situation to 
benefit from EU rights precludes classification as abuse of law. The existence of such an 
additional purpose, which legitimizes the use of EU law, is recognized when the objec-
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tive of free movement rights has been achieved and reflected in economic reality.99 
“‘[P]lanning without abuse’ is a legitimate activity, [and] is reminiscent of the idea of ‘le-
gitimate circumvention’ expressed both in Centros, and in the post-Centros decisions 
on establishment”, as long as the rights are effectively exercised.100 
IV. Abuse in the context of family reunification rights 
In comparison with abuse of law in the context of tax law and free movement of ser-
vices, abuse of law in the context of free movement of persons is a bit of an oddity. 
Scholars tend to either observe the “full rejection of the impact of the concept of abuse 
of law within the field of free movement of workers and citizenship”101 or its reduction 
to a “merely verbal acceptance as a legal principle” in free movement law.102 The first 
case in which this became apparent was Lair.103 The question was whether a short pe-
riod of being a worker was sufficient to be eligible for student assistance in the host-
state on the basis of non-discrimination in comparison with the population of that 
State. German law provided that a worker would only be eligible after a period of five 
years of employment. The Court considered that 
“[i]n so far as […] the three Member States […] are motivated by a desire to prevent cer-
tain abuses, for example where it may be established on the basis of objective evidence 
that a worker has entered a Member State for the sole purpose of enjoying, after a very 
short period of occupational activity, the benefit of the student assistance system in that 
State, it should be observed that such abuses are not covered by the Community provi-
sions in question”.104 
In the field of free movement, the Court, thus, relied on the sole purpose doctrine 
avant la lettre, about a decade before it was further developed in Centros and subse-
quent case-law. 
This dichotomy between free movement of persons and the other freedoms is not 
unique105 and it is often defended on the basis that human beings should, indeed, be 
treated differently than economic transactions.106 Nevertheless, even in the context of 
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free movement rights, the Court does not preclude the existence of abuse and the dis-
cretion of the Member State to take measures against it. On the contrary, it has repeat-
edly confirmed that Member States are allowed to take measures to prevent possible 
abuse. The question remains, however, how such a situation can be distinguished from 
a genuine use of free movement rights. To answer this question, the text of Directive 
2004/38 and the pertaining Communication on its application, that is issued by the 
Commission, are further examined, as well as the case-law of the Court of Justice. 
Art. 35 of Directive 2004/38 holds that “Member States may adopt the necessary 
measures to refuse, terminate, or withdraw any right conferred by this Directive in the 
case of abuse of rights or fraud, such as marriages of convenience”.107 One type of 
abuse of EU law is already mentioned in the provision, namely the attainment of a resi-
dence right on the basis of a marriage of convenience.108 The wording of Art. 35 implies, 
however, that potentially other unspecified usages of the Directive could also be classi-
fied as abuse. The legislator thereby created an – additional – open possibility for the 
limitation of rights, which leaves a legislative gap.109 The question that is answered here 
is whether the U-turn construction to acquire a residence right for a family member, by 
relying on EU law and thereby circumventing national law, also constitutes such an 
abuse of law or not. 
V. The case-law of the Court of Justice on family reunification law 
abuse 
The first case of the Court of Justice on abuse of law, in the context of family reunification, 
was Surinder Singh.110 In this case, the Court recognized the possibility that relying on 
family reunification rules, in the context of free movement, can constitute abuse of law 
and that Member States can act against it. It considered: “the facilities created by the Trea-
ty cannot have the effect of allowing the persons who benefit from them to evade the ap-
plication of national legislation and of prohibiting Member States from taking the 
measures necessary to prevent such abuse”.111 The Court did not yet, however, specify 
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what types of behaviour could constitute such abuse. Instead, the Court created the pos-
sibility for the use of EU law to circumvent national family reunification rules, by establish-
ing that once a family member acquires a residence right in the host state, where an EU 
citizen resides, he is able to retain these rights upon return to the home state of the EU 
citizen, which was discussed above. Years later, the Surinder Singh exception to the purely 
internal situation was confirmed in Akrich, Eind, Metock and in O. and B. and continues to 
be applicable law.112 How does the possibility to apply this U-turn construction in the field 
of family reunification relate to the general doctrine on abuse of law? Can it be considered 
to be abuse of law, and if yes, under which circumstances?113 
Akrich was a first test-case in the context of free movement and family reunification 
and involved a British-Moroccan couple who applied the U-turn construction to legalize 
the residence status of the Moroccan spouse. To achieve this, the couple moved to Ire-
land where the British spouse took up a temporary job, entitling the Moroccan partner to 
a residence right. When they wanted to return to the UK, they admitted that the only rea-
son they moved to Ireland was to acquire a residence right for the Moroccan spouse on 
the basis of EU law. The Court considered that when an EU citizen “pursues or wishes to 
pursue an effective and genuine activity”114, this cannot constitute an abuse within the 
meaning of the Surinder Singh judgment. “If there is a genuine exercise of an economic 
activity as defined by the Court of Justice, its preconditions cannot at the same time be 
created artificially”.115 Moreover, for the evaluation of the nature of the activity that is pur-
sued, “the motives […] are of no account […] nor are [they] relevant in assessing the legal 
situation of the couple at the time of their return to the Member State of which the work-
er is a national”.116 The Court, thus, seemed to deviate from the two-step abuse of law test 
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that was formulated in Emsland-Stärke because, in Akrich, the subjective element of this 
test had become inoperative.117 At the same time, the subjective element of the test was 
hollowed in Halifax and would be hollowed even further in Cadbury Schweppes, a couple 
of years after Akrich. Did the Court in Akrich deviate from its standing practice by com-
pletely excluding the relevance of motive to establish abuse of law in the context of free 
movement law? Or should the Court’s leniency in this case be attributed to the general 
development of the EU’s case law on abuse of law, in which the subjective element of the 
two-step abuse test from Emsland-Stärke was declining anyway? 
It followed from Akrich that the use of free movement law to acquire the rights that 
are attached to it cannot be qualified as abuse, as long as the use of these rights is ef-
fective and genuine. This criterion is derived from the case-law on free movement of 
workers, which is laid down in Art. 45 TFEU. In Lawrie-Blum, the Court reiterated that 
the concept of a “worker” should have a communitarian meaning to avoid discrepancies 
in interpretation among the Member States. One of the criteria to qualify as a worker 
under EU law is that the provided services are effective and genuine and rewarded with 
a remuneration.118 When the exercise of free movement rights is effective and genuine, 
there cannot be an abuse of EU law.119 By defining a broad scope for free movement 
law, the Member States do not have much leeway to invoke abuse of law to annul the 
rights that are attached to having the status of a worker in EU law.120 The circumvention 
of national law is permitted, provided that the use of EU law is genuine and effective. 
The Court did not clarify, however, under what circumstances the use of free movement 
right is genuine and effective, and when it is not. 
The shift in the Court’s approach is in line with the development of its case-law 
more generally. The focus on genuine use of EU law is understandable in the light of the 
principle of effectiveness, which precludes easy derogation from EU law by the Member 
States. A narrow construction of abuse of law fits these principles because otherwise, 
Member States could rely on abuse of law to undermine EU law. The increasing role of 
fundamental rights protection in the EU is also reflected in the Court’s case-law. A nar-
row understanding of abuse of law benefits certainty about their rights and future. 
Maybe that is why the Court first relied on a sole purpose approach to abuse of law in 
the context of free movement and family reunification law. 
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VI. The Commission Communication with guidelines for the 
implementation of Directive 2004/38 
A few years after the adoption of Directive 2004/38, the European Commission undertook 
an investigation into the implementation of the Directive in the Member States, which 
showed that uniformity was lacking and that much ambiguity still existed about the obli-
gations it imposes.121 To remedy the faulty implementation, the European Commission 
drafted its guidelines “for better transposition and application of Directive 2004/38”.122 
The Communication recites the general principle that “Community law cannot be 
relied on in case of abuse”.123 Nevertheless, 
“[EU] law promotes the mobility of EU citizens and protects those who have made use of it. 
There is no abuse where EU citizens and their family members obtain a right of residence 
under [EU] law in a Member State other than that of the EU citizen’s nationality as they are 
benefiting from an advantage inherent in the exercise of the right of free movement pro-
tected by the Treaty, regardless of the purpose of their move to that State”.124 
The sole purpose doctrine which the Court developed in Akrich and subsequent 
case-law is clearly recognizable. 
The Communication continues with a description of what behaviour could consti-
tute abuse of law. Pursuant to the text of Art. 35 of Directive 2004/38, it starts with the 
definition of marriages of convenience. “Recital 28 defines marriages of convenience for 
the purpose of the Directive as marriages contracted for the sole purpose of enjoying 
the right of free movement and residence under the Directive that someone would not 
have otherwise”.125 Nevertheless, when the marriage is genuine, it “cannot be consid-
ered as a marriage of convenience simply because it brings an immigration advantage, 
or indeed any other advantage”.126 Neither is the quality of the relationship decisive for 
the application of Art. 35. Analogously, other relationships that came into being “for the 
sole purpose of enjoying the right of free movement and residence” can be the subject 
of national measures to combat abuse, such as a (registered) partnership of conven-
ience or the adoption or recognition of a child with the sole purpose to rely on the free 
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movement legislation to acquire a residence right.127 On the other hand, the Commis-
sion recalls that “[m]easures taken by Member States to fight against marriages of con-
venience may not be such as to deter EU citizens and their family members from mak-
ing use of their right to free movement or unduly encroach on their legitimate rights. 
They must not undermine the effectiveness of Community law or discriminate on 
grounds of nationality”.128 
Subsequently, a set of indicative criteria is given that can be used to determine 
whether there is an abuse of EU law. Among these are the duration of the relationship, 
whether the spouses share a common language, their knowledge about each other, the 
existence of long-term commitments such as concluding a mortgage and cohabitation – 
although it follows from the Court’s case-law that cohabitation is not a requirement to 
qualify for a residence right on the basis of family reunification.129 Member States must 
give due attention to all circumstances of the individual case and may not base a deci-
sion on one single element of the situation.130 The Commission omits to support these 
instructions with reference to case-law. Nevertheless, several elements are recogniza-
ble. The instructions are clearly based on the sole purpose doctrine that is developed by 
the Court.131 The genuine nature of the marriage is decisive, regardless of whether it 
brings any advantage to the spouses. The unimportance of the quality of the relation-
ship for the classification of abuse, furthermore, follows from the case-law in Diatta and 
Ogieriakhi.132 The amplification to other relationships of convenience, on the other 
hand, seems to be an addition by the Commission itself. In 2014, the Commission re-
newed the instructions on the consequences of marriages of convenience in the 
“Handbook on addressing the issue of alleged marriages of convenience between EU 
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citizens and non-EU nationals in the context of EU law on free movement of EU citi-
zens”. This handbook mostly contains the same principles and instructions which were 
included in the Commission Communication of 2009.133 
In addition, according to the Commission, 
“[a]buse could also occur when EU citizens, unable to be joined by their third country 
family members in their Member State of origin because of the application of national 
immigration rules preventing it, move to another Member State with the sole purpose to 
evade, upon returning to their home Member State, the national law that frustrated their 
family reunification efforts, invoking their rights under [EU] law. The defining characteris-
tics of the line between genuine and abusive use of [EU] law should be based on the as-
sessment of whether the exercise of [EU] rights in a Member State from which the EU cit-
izens and their family member(s) return was genuine and effective”.134 
Once again, the codification of the Court’s case-law in Akrich, Levin, and Lawrie-
Blum, which were discussed in the above, is apparent, as well as the applicability of the 
sole purpose approach to abuse in family reunification law. Genuine use of EU rights 
can never constitute abuse of law, regardless of the purpose for which the rights are 
used. If a planned circumvention of national immigration law is realized through such 
genuine use of EU rights, the circumvention is legitimate. 
The assessment of whether the use of EU law is genuine and effective “can only be 
made on a case-by-case basis” and can be carried out on the basis of another set of cri-
teria provided by the Commission Communication. Previous unsuccessful attempts to 
acquire residence for a third-country spouse under national law can be taken into ac-
count, as well as efforts made to establish in the host Member State, including national 
registration formalities and securing accommodation, enrolling children at an educa-
tional establishment and acquiring a job. Also here, due attention must be paid to all 
the relevant circumstances and a decision may not be based on one single element of 
the case.135 Moreover, “[i]t cannot be inferred that the residence in the host Member 
State is not genuine and effective only because an EU citizen maintains some ties to the 
home Member State […] [and] [t]he mere fact that a person consciously places himself 
in a situation conferring a right does not in itself constitute a sufficient basis for assum-
ing that there is abuse”.136 
Lastly, the Communication mentions that “the Directive must be interpreted and 
applied in accordance with fundamental rights […] as guaranteed in the European Con-
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vention of Human Rights (ECHR) and as reflected in the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights”.137 And that investigations into alleged abuse situations “must be carried out in 
accordance with fundamental rights, in particular with Articles 8 (right to respect for 
private and family life) and 12 (right to marry) of the ECHR (Articles 7 and 9 of the EU 
Charter)”.138 In the light of this obligation and the interest of the families involved to live 
together with their loved ones, it is sequacious that abuse of law is interpreted narrowly 
and in accordance with the sole purpose approach.139 Families thus enjoy more certain-
ty about their rights and about their future.  
VII. The follow-up 
In the years after Akrich and the publiction of the Commission Communication, the 
Court of Justice was relatively silent on the doctrine of abuse of law in the context of 
family reunification,140 until 2014, when O. and B. was handed down.141 In this case, the 
Court reiterated its abuse of law doctrine and considered:  
“[T]he scope of Union law cannot be extended to cover abuses […]. Proof of such an 
abuse requires, first, a combination of objective circumstances in which, despite formal 
observance of the conditions laid down by the European Union rules, the purpose of 
those rules has not been achieved, and, secondly, a subjective element consisting in the 
intention to obtain an advantage from the European Union rules by artificially creating 
the conditions laid down for obtaining it”.142 
The Court, thus, re-established the Emsland-Stärke test to determine whether there 
is an abuse of law but also reiterated that there can only be abuse when the conditions 
under which a right is obtained are wholly artificial, which followed from Cadbury 
Schweppes.143 
In addition, O. and B. clarified the condition that residence in the host Member 
State must have been effective and genuine before rights can be retained in a return 
situation. Effective and genuine exercise of EU rights requires: 
“to settle in the host Member State in a way which would be such as to create or 
strengthen family life in that Member State […]. [A] Union citizen who exercises his rights 
under Article 6(1) of Directive 2004/38 does not intend to settle in the host Member State 
[…]. […] Residence in the host Member State pursuant to and in conformity with the con-
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ditions set out in Article 7(1) of that directive is, in principle, evidence of settling there 
and therefore of the Union citizen’s genuine residence in the host Member State and 
goes hand in hand with creating and strengthening family life in that Member State”.144 
A difference is made between short-term travel and long-term settling in the host 
Member State in accordance with Art. 7 of Directive 2004/38. This provision determines 
that “[a]ll Union citizens shall have the right of residence on the territory of another 
Member State for a period of longer than three months if they” qualify as a worker, self-
employed, economically not active with sufficient resources or as a student. The text of 
this provision seems to imply that Art. 7 can only be applicable after a minimum of 
three months of residence. O. and B. was, therefore, understood as the introduction of 
a requirement of a three months residence in the host-state, before a family member’s 
residence right can be retained upon return to the home Member State of the EU citi-
zen.145 The interpretation also means that the genuineness of the exercise of free 
movement rights is made dependent on a set period of three months of residence. 
However, is it sensible to link duration of residence with its genuineness in itself? And – 
if it is installed anyway – how can a minimum period of residence be determined for the 
use of rights to be genuine, without being inevitably arbitrary in posing this condition? 
“Why can a Union citizen who has lived for 3.5 months in another Member State, in 
which he met his partner be joined by her when he returns to this Member State of 
origin and why is this not possible for the Union citizen who visits another Member 
State for a period of many consecutive years?”.146 It seems hard to accept that the peri-
od of residence is decisive in itself for residence to be genuine, rather than being one of 
the relevant criteria to decide so.147 
This Article proposes a different interpretation of O. and B. Art. 6 of Directive 
2004/38 provides the right to visit any Member State for up to three months, without 
the need to fulfil any conditions to exercise that right. Art. 7 of Directive 2004/38 pro-
vides the right to reside in another Member State for a period of longer than three 
months when certain criteria are fulfilled. Accordingly, when an EU citizen wishes to 
have a right to reside in the territory of another Member States for a period of longer 
than three months, he must comply with the criteria in Art. 7. That does not mean that 
an individual cannot rely on Art. 7 and reside in a Member State in accordance with the 
criteria in that provision before those three months elapse. Any other conclusion would 
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imply that exercising the rights derived from Art. 6 for three months is a precondition to 
rely on Art. 7 and to register at the municipality of residence. This is not the case. Such a 
condition is not included in Directive 2004/38 and would also be very difficult to en-
force. As a result, it is already possible from the first day of arrival to register as a resi-
dent in accordance with Art. 7 of Directive 2004/38. Does that mean that the Court’s 
judgment can be interpreted as applying from the day that the requirements of Art. 7 
are fulfilled, which in theory could even be after a single day of residence in the host 
state? Accepting this view would imply that even one day of residence in conformity 
with Art. 7 could already be sufficient to derive family reunification rights in the host 
Member State and upon return in the home Member State of the EU citizen.148 Addi-
tionally, a family who resides in the host Member State for much longer than three 
months without complying with the conditions in Art. 7 of Directive 2004/38 would be 
deprived of the protection of the directive in the host state and after return in the EU 
citizen’s home Member State.149  
Considering the Court’s wording, however, ultimately the duration of residence is not 
decisive to derive family reunification rights but whether residence in the host state is 
“such as to create or strengthen family life in that Member State”, which should be as-
sessed on a case-by-case basis. Three months of residence in the host Member State in 
accordance with the conditions in Art. 7 of Directive 2004/38 could then be used as a pre-
sumption of having created or strengthened family life, rather than as a precondition. This 
interpretation is in line with the Court’s wording in O. and B., in which it considered that 
“[r]esidence in the host Member State pursuant to and in conformity with the conditions 
set out in Article 7(1) of that directive […] goes hand in hand with creating and strengthen-
ing family life in that Member State”.150 Thus, creation and strengthening of family life is 
presumed when there is a three months residence that is in conformity with Art. 7 of Di-
rective 2004/38, but this does not exclude the possibility that a period of less than three 
months could also create or strengthen family life, provided that the residence is still ex-
ercised in conformity with Art. 7 of the Directive. This approach would allow for real case-
by-case assessment of the use of rights, which, aside from the duration of residence, 
could take other parameters into account including cohabitation, intensity of the contact 
and the duration of the relationship. Residence for more than three months would not 
automatically lead to the retention of residence rights but would need to be complement-
ed with other evidence that family life was created or strengthened. In addition, residence 
for less than three months would not automatically lead to the denial of the retention of 
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residence rights but would need to be compensated with other evidence that family life 
was created or strengthened to be entitled to those rights. 
VIII. Abuse v. non-applicability of EU law 
Considering the abuse of law doctrine and the case-law of the Court in the field of family 
reunification, the question arises how abuse of law can be distinguished from the lack of 
fulfilment for the conditions of a right.151 In O. and B., the Court reiterated the Member 
States’ competence to combat abuse of law but it did not link abuse of law to the non-
fulfilment of the criterion to have created or strengthened family life in the host Member 
State. Rather, it formulated a condition for the possibility to rely on Directive 2004/38 by 
analogy for family reunification after return to the home Member State. When this condi-
tion is not fulfilled, it is not a matter of abuse but a matter of non-compliance with the 
conditions for family reunification, on the basis of EU law upon return to the home Mem-
ber State. When the conditions for family reunification are not fulfilled, there is no enti-
tlement to a right, so there cannot be an abuse of rights either. And mutatis mutandis, 
when the conditions for family reunification are fulfilled, there is a right to family reunifi-
cation which cannot be considered to be abuse, even if national law was circumvented.152 
There is a difference between marriages of convenience and the Europe-route. 
When national law is circumvented, it depends on the circumstances of the case wheth-
er it can be classified as abuse or not. When a marriage of convenience is discovered, it 
is always abuse.153 Even then, however, the question about the distinction between 
non-applicability and abuse can be raised. Since the rights that are granted by Directive 
2004/38 are declaratory, it could be argued that the annulment of a marriage means 
that there was never a family relationship.154 In that case, the conditions for family reu-
nification were never fulfilled and the residence right never existed. Consequently, the 
marriage would not be considered to be abuse of law, but Directive 2004/38 would 
simply not be applicable, which positions the withdrawal or termination of a residence 
right that results from the discovery of a marriage of convenience outside the scope of 
EU law altogether. The mere existence of Art. 35 of Directive 2004/38 opposes this view, 
because it provides that the termination or withdrawal of a residence right due to the 
discovery of a marriage of convenience should take place in accordance with the safe-
guards the directive provides for. It is suggested that the conclusion of a marriage of 
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convenience and the pursuant – faulty – recognition of a residence right precludes the 
existence of this right ex tunc but still brings the situation within the scope of Directive 
2004/38. The national measures to withdraw the residence right should, therefore, be 
taken in accordance with Art. 35 of the Directive.155 This means that safeguards of pro-
portionality should be applied,156 which are not applicable if the withdrawal of a resi-
dence right would fall outside the scope of the Directive altogether.157 In that case, the 
only safeguard that would still be available for the third-country national who lost his 
residence right is found in general international law, most notably in Art. 8 ECHR. As 
was mentioned earlier, the de facto protection of residence by Art. 8 ECHR is limited be-
cause its basic premise is very different than under EU law. Art. 8 ECHR departs from 
the authority of the Member States to decide on the entry of non-nationals into their 
territory.158 Only when there are strong social and family ties in the Member State of 
residence non-admission or expulsion breaches the immigrant’s right to family life.159 
To determine whether this is the case, a balance must be struck between the interest of 
the State and the interest of the individual. Still, as was shown in this Article, Art. 8 ECHR 
may provide a safety net for residence for those who fall outside the scope of EU law.160 
A similar approach can be taken when an EU citizen and his family member want to 
rely on Directive 2004/38 in a return situation but fail to comply with the criterion of 
creating or strengthening family life in the host Member State before their return. If the 
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criteria in O. and B. are considered to be a threshold for the applicability of EU law, non-
compliance with those criteria results in non-applicability of EU law. Classifying reliance 
on the case-law of the Court in Surinder Singh and O. and B., when the condition to cre-
ate or strengthen family life is not fulfilled, as a form of abuse of law, on the other hand, 
triggers the applicability of Art. 35 of Directive 2004/38. In that case, the refusal of a res-
idence right must be proportionate and must observe the procedural requirements in 
the Directive.161 Hence, it seems in the interest of the involved families in cases of mar-
riages of convenience and in return situations to apply the concept of abuse, rather 
than conclude that Directive 2004/38 is not applicable. Because if Directive 2004/38 is 
not applicable, the implication is that a situation is purely internal to the Member State 
and falls outside the scope of EU law. As was explained above, in that case only Art. 8 
ECHR is left to provide protection and safeguards against expulsion or non-admission, 
but to qualify for residence under this provision is a high threshold. When a situation is 
qualified as abuse of rights, on the other hand, it comes within the scope of EU law and 
is, therefore, no longer a purely internal situation. As a result, safeguards derived from 
EU law are applicable before a residence right can be refused or withdrawn, for the bet-
ter of the families involved. 
IX. Concluding remarks 
The beginning of this Article problematized the tension between the principle of equali-
ty and the division of competences in the EU. Equality is an ideal to strive for that is an-
chored in the EU Treaties but is contrasted with the preservation of Member States’ 
sovereignty. This tension is particularly prevalent in family reunification. The EU is com-
petent to regulate family reunification for EU citizens who make use of their free 
movement rights, while those who do not use their free movement rights fall under the 
competence of the Member States. Member States often impose stricter requirements 
for family reunification than the EU, whereby they reversely discriminate their own na-
tionals, insofar as they did not use free movement rights. The existence of reverse dis-
crimination is counter intuitive and if the EU and its Member States do not take up the 
responsibility to remedy this inequality it may seriously undermine the EU’s legitimacy. 
In the meantime, however, this Article explored another partial remedy to reverse dis-
crimination within the constitutional limits of the EU. 
In its case-law, the Court of Justice decided that residence rights for a family mem-
ber of an EU citizen, who made use of free movement rights, can be retained after re-
turn to the home Member State of the EU citizen, provided that the exercise of those 
rights was effective and genuine. This means that an EU citizen can circumvent national 
family reunification law by temporarily moving to another Member State and then re-
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turn with residence rights for his family member. This possibility empowers EU citizens 
who face reverse discrimination to escape from it. It remains a liability that only EU citi-
zens who are already empowered can benefit from this route which requires financial 
investment and knowledgeability, but at the same time, this solution stays within the 
constitutional limits of EU law. Member States may want to act, however, against cir-
cumvention of their national laws. Therefore, they have the possibility to classify cir-
cumvention of national law as an abuse of rights, which legitimizes the refusal or with-
drawal of residence rights. At the same time, relying on abuse of law undermines legal 
certainty and the certainty for families about whether they are able to live with their 
loved ones. Especially, because it is uncomfortable in itself that it is needed to use or 
abuse free movement rights to live together as a family. For these reasons, the con-
struction of the scope of abuse of law is very important. A broad scope of abuse of law 
gives way to frequent intervention by the Member States to protect themselves from 
circumvention of their national law. A narrow scope of abuse of law, on the other hand, 
limits the scope of application by the Member States and offers more protection to the 
rights of citizens. In the case-law of the Court, a movement can be observed, from a 
broad essential purpose construction of abuse of law, towards a narrower sole purpose 
construction of abuse of law. The shift in the general abuse of law doctrine is even 
stronger in the field of family reunification, where the impact of abuse of law is almost 
fully rejected and reduced to a merely verbal legal principle. The crucial criteria for a le-
gitimate use of EU law that was formulated in cases such as Akrich, O. and B., and Co-
man is that use of EU rights is effective and genuine. More concretely, to retain resi-
dence rights upon return to the home Member State of the EU citizen, residence in the 
host Member State must be such as to have created or strengthened family life. Follow-
ing the Court’s decision in O. and B., a new interpretation of this criterion was suggest-
ed. It was proposed to adopt a presumption of having created or strengthened family 
life when residence in the host Member State had a duration of more than three 
months in accordance with Art. 7 of Directive 2004/38, rather than making the three 
months a fixed condition to retain a residence right. Periods of residence less than 
three months, in accordance with Art. 7 of Directive 2004/38, would then not automati-
cally lead to the refusal of a residence right in the home Member State upon return but 
require additional evidence of having created or strengthened family life. 
The focus on genuine use of EU law and the impact of the movement on family life 
is quite understandable. Considering the importance the Court attached to the principle 
of effectiveness in EU law, it is unsurprising that it does not easily allow for derogation 
by the Member States through invoking abuse of law. In addition, it is in line with the 
increasing role of fundamental rights protection, provided by the ECHR and by the 
Charter, in the EU legal order that protection of the family is prioritized over protecting 
the enforcement of national migration law. That may also be the reason why the Court, 
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first, shifted towards the sole purpose doctrine in the context of free movement rights, 
several years before it did so in other fields of EU law. 
Although the protection of the family by EU law is commended, constructing the 
scope of abuse of law too narrowly could also backfire. The decisions of the Court in its 
most recent case-law could suggest that there is no more place for abuse of law, and non-
compliance with the conditions to retain residence rights upon return to the home Mem-
ber State of the EU citizen simply results in non-applicability of EU law. That interpretation 
would, however, reduce a return situation in which the requirement of genuine residence 
is not fulfilled to a purely internal situation, without any protection provided by EU law. 
Possibly, protection by the ECHR could offer solace, but this protection is less extensive 
than the protection by EU law. Classifying non-compliance with the conditions for reliance 
on EU law in a return situation as abuse of rights, on the other hand, would bring the situ-
ation within the scope of EU law and requires that procedural safeguards provided by the 
directive are observed. Thus, arguably, a narrow construction of abuse of law benefits EU 
citizens and their family members, because it provides certainty about their rights and fu-
ture, but when the requirements for a right are not fulfilled they are better off when it is 
qualified as abuse than when EU law is considered not to be applicable. Although this 
conclusion is counterintuitive, it may even be a better solution from the perspective of 
reconciling the principle of equality and the principle of the division of competences in EU 
law. More people would fall within the scope of EU law, and even if their behaviour is 
qualified as abuse, their safeguards against deprivation of the rights they obtained are 
more equal than they would have been outside the scope of EU law. 
 
